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Tristan Garcia’s Form and Object has been framed primarily as a contribution to object 
oriented metaphysics. In this article, I shall explicate and defend four claims that bring it closer 
to the modern critical tradition: 1) that Garcia’s Form and Object can be read, profitably, within 
the tradition of reflection upon the nature of possessions, self-possession and possessiveness; 
2) that to read the book in this way is to see Garcia as the French heir to C. B. McPherson 
although it will be argued that what this amounts to is that while McPherson was the anti-
Locke, so to speak, Garcia is the anti-Rousseau; 3) that this framing has significant 
consequences for our reception of Form and Object in that it can be understood as a book that 
not only marks a moment in debates surrounding speculative realism and object oriented 
ontology but that it also, and primarily, marks an important moment in debates about the 
encroachment of things and the culture of possession that, in part, defines modernity; 4) that 
there is a novel ontological position within Form and Object, one that is neither relational nor 
individualist, that presents a challenging account of ‘the chance and the price’ of living after 
possession and how to overcome the deleterious effects of contemporary consumer societies.  
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The following questions may have an air of both familiarity and unfamiliarity for those who 
work within the tradition of modern European philosophy: 1) What if pots, pans, pliers and 
setsquares fell from the skies? 2) What if we have property in our own person? 3) What if 
people were simple enough to believe the first person that put a spade into the ground and said 
‘this is mine’? 4) What if we are not in full possession of ourselves? 5) What if there is nothing, 
not a single thing, that is in possession of itself? These five questions trace a trajectory within 
the last 500 years of modern European philosophy guided by a desire to understand - and also 
to halt - the steady encroachment of things. As we shall see, it is a trajectory that begins and 
ends in uncertainty. However, for most of the 500 years it has been weaving its way through 
the Western canon of modern European thought those that defined this trajectory were guided 
by one deeply held certainty: if we don’t possess ourselves then the world of things will come 
to possess us. Indeed, it is not too much of an exaggeration to say that one of the key problems 
that defines the ‘modern’ in modern European thought is the problem of possession.  
This is not a new thought; it first appears in the work of C.B. Macpherson and in 
particular his interpretation of early modern English political thought, The Political Theory of 
Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke.1 Hobbes, Harrington, Locke; all were driven by a 
shared belief in the self-possession of the individual person, a belief that both gave rise to 
deeply radical forms of liberalism that unhooked patriarchy and slavery from their allegedly 
naturalist bases and that also wove the idea of private property into the very fabric of the person, 
engendering and legitimating massive inequalities ever since. As Joseph Carens neatly 
summarises Macpherson’s position: ‘The possessive individualist version of democracy denies 
and conceals the oppression and class domination inherent in a society based upon private – 
and unequal – property’.2 But Macpherson’s analyses and diagnoses only captured part of a 
bigger picture. Historically, they did not reach back into Renaissance concerns with ‘the 
vanities’ that shaped so many of the key themes of modernity but nor did they connect forward, 
so to speak, to the problem of possession that guided the philosophers of suspicion; Nietzsche, 
Marx and Freud.3 One of the consequences of this latter omission is that Macpherson did little 
to interrogate the grounds of his own position, such that he didn’t reflect deeply enough upon 
the idea that his own socialist critique of liberalism was thoroughly reliant upon the same 
notions of self-possession and possessiveness that were the target of his critique.4 But is it 
possible to find a way of framing the problem of possession without falling back into partial 
and un-reflexive gestures? Moreover, if we can find a better way of framing this problem then 
the stakes are high: we can rethink the ‘modern’ in modern European thought and, in doing so, 
we may, perhaps, find our way out of ‘the culture of possession’ that sustains the ‘cultures of 
consumption’ that shape our contemporary lives.5 A broader and deeper analysis of the problem 
may mean that there is a chance to think and to live after possession. 
A seemingly unlikely text to turn to in this regard is Tristan Garcia’s Form and Object: 
A Treatise on Things.6 It is unlikely because the text has been presented, to Anglophone readers 
at least, as a work of systematic philosophy that is a part of the contemporary turn away from 
the parochial concerns of modern critical theory.7 Nonetheless, in the following discussion, I 
shall explicate and defend four claims that bring it back into contact with this critical tradition: 
1) that Garcia’s Form and Object can be read, profitably, within this tradition of reflection 
upon the nature of possessions, self-possession and possessiveness; 2) that to read the book in 
this way is to see Garcia as the French heir to McPherson although it will be argued that what 
this amounts to is that while McPherson was the anti-Locke, so to speak, Garcia is the anti-
Rousseau; 3) that this framing has significant consequences for our reception of Form and 
Object in that it can be understood as a book that not only marks a moment in debates 
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surrounding speculative realism and object oriented ontology but that it also, and primarily, 
marks an important moment in debates about the encroachment of things and the culture of 
possession that, in part, defines modernity; 4) that there is a novel ontological position within 
Form and Object, one that is neither relational nor individualist, that presents a challenging 
account of ‘the chance and the price’ of living after possession and how to overcome the 
deleterious effects of contemporary consumer societies.  
In order to make sense of these claims, I will sketch out the trajectory of thought 
oriented by the problem of possession within which, as will be argued, we can locate Garcia’s 
book. I will then demarcate what I take to be the central problem addressed by Garcia - under 
the conceptual banner of ‘the compact’ or the ‘principle of compactness’ - and consider how 
his analyses decisively reorient the problem of possession through his controversial yet 
perceptive discussion of the nature of things and objects. What is at stake, as I will argue, is 
whether or not we can conceive of a critique of possessiveness that does not rely upon either a 
relational or an individualistic ontology. In the end, it will be concluded that Garcia’s own 
cautious, uncertain, approach offers a compelling vision of both the price we may pay by giving 
up on self-ownership and the chance that may be afforded us if we have the courage to think 
after possession.  
 
The Problem of Possession: the first four questions 
In his Garcian Meditations, Jon Cogburn introduces Garcia’s particular brand of realism by 
way of a ‘Whig history’ that enables us to situate it within ‘dialectical space’ in order to get a 
‘sense of what is at stake’.8 It is a similar gesture that orients this discussion, even though the 
dialectical space is construed differently. Where Cogburn begins his Whig history with Plato’s 
myth of the cave in order to demarcate philosophy’s perennial concern with the competing 
claims of realism and idealism so as to situate Garcia’s text as an important contribution to this 
debate, I shall draw a more local or limited historical frame, that of the modern concern with 
the rise of things and their seeming capacity to dominate human life. In doing so, I do not 
disagree with Cogburn’s framing of Garcia’s contribution; indeed, much of what I will draw 
upon in the following discussion is deeply indebted to his insightful reading of Garcia’s 
contribution as a metaphysician. However, as will become apparent as this discussion unfolds, 
framing Garcia’s project as a contribution to modern European thought does allow us to focus 
on elements of his work that Cogburn’s presentation does not foreground. Namely, we can 
profitably read Garcia’s Form and Object as concerned with the problem of possession that has 
run through modern European thought and therefore consider it as a (perhaps surprising) book 
of critical theory, without diminishing its ostensible metaphysical project (so ably interrogated 
by Cogburn). This framing, a more critically oriented Whig history, can be given by 
considering the dialectical trajectory contained within the first four questions set out above.  
Question 1: What if pots, pans, pliers and setsquares fell from the skies? And more: 
bellows, rakes, stools, ladders, bagpipes and many unidentified objects. This question is 
inspired by Leonardo da Vinci’s sketch, A Cloudburst of Material Possessions, drawn circa 
1510-13.9 This image is a startling demonstration of the early modern, Renaissance, concern 
with the rapidly expanding world of things, tools, objects, possessions. But it not clear what is 
at stake. Some years before this sketch, Savoranola had decisively come down on the side of 
the modest man in his ‘bonfire of the vanities’: an unambiguous defence of the necessary 
relationship of modesty to Godliness.10 In his sketch, da Vinci is much less certain about what 
it is that is happening in the world of things, what it is doing to us, and what we may do in 
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return. The objects are typically tools, functional objects, not Savoranola’s ‘luxuries’; the 
objects are falling from the sky to earth rather than being burned on the earth to return them to 
the sky; there are no people crushed by this cloudburst; the whole thing seems to suggest an 
orderliness that speaks of the clash of naturalism and mechanism rather than earthliness and 
Godliness; it is an impersonal invasion of the functional object and it is unclear what the human 
response to it could possibly be; no bonfire of these tools, it seems, would ever halt the 
downpour. Da Vinci’s subtlety is his uncertainty; this drawing catches a glimpse of the 
emergent world of modern capitalist economies, where our relationship to the functional 
objects that have made us able to build both palaces and hovels will no longer make sense, 
where they are no longer simply objects ‘for us’ but objects that will simply rain down upon 
us. 
Question 2: But what if we already have property in our own person? This Lockean 
question continues the errant line of this Whig history by virtue of providing the first properly 
philosophical response to da Vinci’s cloudburst of material possessions.11 By the time of his 
Second Treatise on Government, Locke’s 17th Century Europe was beginning to feel the 
political shock waves of the rise of possessions: a whole class of people who felt that their 
possessions were theirs alone, inalienably, and not the property of the Monarch. But the new 
political language of consent was not enough to secure these possessions; another route had to 
be found.12 In one of the most dramatic twists of modern political theory, Locke declared that 
we already have property in our own person, that we therefore own what we do with our person, 
our labour, and that whatever we mix our labour with is rightfully ours. The cloudburst of 
material possessions could be harvested, channelled and turned into ever more possessions; 
simply pick up whatever nature has bequeathed and by virtue of having mixed your labour with 
it, it is your private property, by right, inalienably. The uncertainty of da Vinci’s sketch is 
replaced, therefore, with Locke’s certainty in our own self-possession and certainty therefore 
in our ability to reap the rewards of the cloudburst, at least for those emergent bourgeois that 
were hard working enough and endowed of the right spirit. 
Question 3: What if people were simple enough to believe the first person who put a 
spade into the ground and said ‘this is mine’? It was already clear – for Savonarola but also for 
some of Locke’s contemporaries, the puritans, for example – that legitimating the rampant 
accumulation of material possessions could have disastrous effects on social harmony. Yet, if 
burning the possessions was not the answer, and if simply denying oneself these possessions 
in the name of purity was not going to stop others from their accumulation, then how could the 
negative effects of possessiveness be overcome? It was Rousseau, in his ‘Discourse On the 
Origins and Foundations of Inequality Among Mankind’, that diagnosed the problem of 
possessiveness and it’s resolution in genuinely social terms.13 The problem arose when the 
noble savages were simple enough to allow one of their kind to say ‘this is mine’ and so the 
problem had to be addressed by a properly general act of will that would bring people back 
together in a conscious harmony of ends, one in which the institution of private property was 
thoroughly subordinate to those ends. By agreeing with each that we will do what is best for 
all rather than simply for those that possess property we will create a new political body in 
which each member is indivisible from the whole; a true social compact.14 This compact he 
defines as the total alienation of each individual with all of his rights to the whole community; 
only then will the division and inequality brought about by the cloudburst of material 
possessions be held in check, not by the self-possession of the industrious bourgeois but by the 
total possession of all within the compact forged through the general will. 
It seemed that these two forms of self-possession were the only way to respond to the 
cloudburst of material possessions: the self-possession of the individual and the self-possession 
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of the community (and in many respects these two options still define our available responses 
to ‘cultures of consumerism’). Of course, both are responses ‘on the side of the subject’, so to 
speak. Whatever else divided Locke and Rousseau, they agreed that the world of things, of 
possessions, required a completely self-possessed subject (individual or community) in order 
to control rather be controlled by possessions.  
Question 4: But what if we humans are not in full possession of ourselves? This was 
the question raised by the three great Victorian ‘masters of suspicion’, to use Paul Ricoeur’s 
phrase: Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud (and of course we could add the fourth, Darwin, though 
his project was less guided by ‘suspicion’).15 Each of these thinkers gave us reason to be 
suspicious of complete self-possession – either individual or collective. Perhaps the 
development of modes of production was out of our conscious control; perhaps we were driven 
by slavish resentments that we never realised; perhaps our desires never let us possess ourselves 
completely? This was the right line of enquiry, a line that pushed at the limits of our certainty 
about self-possession in the search for a world after possession. And yet, each of these thinkers 
failed to step over the limits that they nonetheless recognised as constitutive of our deeply 
problematic relationship with possessions, because they each remained wedded, in the end, to 
the promise of a subjective resolution to come.  
 
The Problem of Possession: the fifth question 
One reason we know that the masters of suspicion never crossed this limit is that we now 
understand at least one of the questions to ask when it is truly crossed: what if nothing, not a 
single thing, is in possession of itself? This question is at the heart of Form and Object; to 
which I shall now turn. 
Garcia begins Form and Object with a cautious statement: ‘Our time is perhaps the time 
of an epidemic of things’.16 It is a time that reaches back to da Vinci’s and it is a time he, da 
Vinci, might recognise. According to Garcia, there is ‘a kind of “thingly” contamination of the 
present’ and a ‘desubstantialisation’ of things.17 But it also a time that Locke would 
acknowledge, a time of the ‘industrialisation of production’, and even Rousseau could embrace 
Garcia’s opening appeal to the fact that this contamination is hard to comprehend ‘without 
suffering from it’.18 And most assuredly, the masters of suspicion would dwell on Garcia’s 
insistence that resisting this epidemic with all the usual means ready to hand is pointless, ‘a 
waste of time and effort’.19  
And yet, even from the opening lines there is an air of difference about Garcia’s 
ruminations, something that speaks to the problem of possession but that does so in an original 
way. On the one hand, he speaks of an epidemic – things have some capacity to get inside of 
us and infect us like a virus, which immediately forces the uneasy thought that whatever we 
think is the difference between us and things it is not as clear cut as we typically presume. Just 
as the biologist can venture an organic continuity between humans and our viral co-existents, 
so Garcia seeks to establish a continuum between humans and things such that he proposes ‘a 
new model of the division of things – of things around us, of things in us, and of us among 
things’.20 On the other hand, the epidemic is ‘an epidemic of things’, those abstracted 
metaphysical entities that we know, for many, are the most basic entities of all. How can such 
seemingly metaphysical and abstract entities infect us at all, and to such epidemic proportions 
that it defines our time? For Garcia, one of the key reasons for this is that we are not only things 
that think, but our thinking is itself a thing: ‘we must understand that by initially thinking about 
things we are not prevented from conceiving of our thought, language and knowledge as things 
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equal to things thought, said and known’.21 Garcia’s opening framing of his project in Form 
and Object, therefore, already stakes out new ground for thinking about this epidemic, the 
ground being a maximally flat ontology of things.  
The idea of a flat ontology – an ontological scheme in which there is no formal 
hierarchy between entities, which therefore attributes ‘an equal ontological dignity to each 
individuated thing’22 – has become commonplace in many of the recent discussions around 
new materialism, speculative realism and object oriented ontologies.23 Although Harman notes 
that ‘this sort of “flat ontology” has been familiar since the time of Alexius Meinong’,24 Garcia 
credits Manuel DeLanda’s ‘rereading of Gilles Deleuze’s philosophy’ with the ‘idea of a “flat 
ontology”’.25 But where Meinong and Deleuze (and DeLanda) have faltered, Garcia seeks to 
tread confidently towards the ‘central claim’ that ‘no classical determination – including the 
property of being non-contradictory, of being individuated, or of having identity or unity – is 
contained in our concept of the most unrestricted, emptiest thing and in the most formal 
possibility of a “thing”’.26 He goes on: ‘we consider as inessential all that may characterise a 
thing until we have properly identified what defines it as a thing, and not as a consistent thing, 
individual thing, or one thing. We thus aim…at the being of de-determined things’.27 The sheer 
reach of this claim is evident if we recall that Garcia’s ‘things’ not only include those 
conventional things, the number of which is rising to epidemic proportions ‘in our time’, but 
also that which is ‘thought, said and known’. That the latter may not be consistent, individuated 
or ‘one’ is a challenge for even the flattest of flat ontologies. 
Cogburn has presented the most compelling account of just how flat Garcia’s flat 
ontology really is when he considers it in the context of Harman’s characterisation of 
speculative realism.28 For Harman, speculative realists either reject the idea that ‘human-world’ 
relations stand at the centre of philosophy or the claim that all knowledge is finite and therefore 
unable to grasp reality in its own right.29 He aligns himself with the former but not the latter. 
But as Cogburn argues, Garcia rejects both claims: the human-world relation is not at the centre 
of philosophy and yet knowledge of things, ‘in their own right’, is possible. As Cogburn 
demonstrates, however, ‘the price to pay’ for holding both of these positions is ‘the cost of 
characterising reality as a contradictory whole’, a position that brings Garcia close to that of 
Graham Priest and Paul Livingstone to the extent that these thinkers also give an account of 
the contradictory (Priest) or paradoxical (Livingstone) nature of the whole.30   
For all that he is not alone in thinking reality as a contradictory or paradoxical whole, 
the strangeness of Garcia’s project is evident: ‘to prove that it is possible to describe the non-
trivial qualities of a world of things lacking all qualities. Once the possibility of such a flat 
world of de-determined things is accepted, we must still prove its necessity, or at least its 
utility’.31 As such, we should not let the flatness of Garcia’s ontology of things distract us from 
its value in, one might say, a traditional sense. As noted above, Garcia clearly feels that there 
is ‘an epidemic of things’ and he writes to convince people of this feeling; ‘the goal of this 
work is to bring those who do not yet share this feeling to admit it, and to propose to those who 
already admit it a way of ridding oneself of it’.32 And again: ‘This treatise is for those of us 
who love things, but who struggle in the face of their accumulation. It aims to put a thought to 
the test: a thought about things rather than a thought about our thought about things’.33 For all 
the strangeness of Form and Object, therefore, there is what I shall call a framing diagnostic-
therapeutic dialectic organising the discussion, albeit one that begins on the side of ‘that solitary 
something in each thing that can never be reduced to anything else’34 rather than on the side of 
the ailing subject. Perhaps that ‘solitary something’, once diagnosed, offers up a way of 
‘ridding oneself’ of the feeling that there is an ‘epidemic of things’; or, at least, that we can rid 
ourselves of the feeling that this epidemic will infect the whole of humanity? It is one of the 
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startling, and most original aspects of his work, that Garcia addresses this diagnostic-
therapeutic dialectic from the side of things, so to speak. The gamble is that a better, by which 
in this case is meant a flatter, account of things will stop the epidemic. Not only does Form 
and Object offer up a new account of realism, as Cogburn eloquently argues,35 it offers up a 
new way of responding to the seemingly unstoppable rise of things that characterises capitalist 
modernity; new, because no one prior to Garcia has thought to address this issue from the side 
of the thing. But how does he do this and what is to be gained by such a counter-intuitive 
philosophical gesture? In order to answer these questions, we must grasp the problem at the 
heart of Form and Object. 
 
The Compact: Garcia’s Version of the Problem of Possession 
The self-avowed tasks of Form and Object are ‘a new model of the division of things’36 and an 
‘encyclopaedia and topography of the universe and objects’.37 The former is driven by the 
desire for a flat ontology, ‘in which any thing, sensu stricto, is equivalent to another thing’38 
and a formal system of the negative in order to provide the de-determined thing with its 
minimum definition: ‘a thing is nothing other than the difference between that which is in this 
thing and that in which this thing is’.39 Therefore, the formal section of the book is not a way 
of sorting things, of ordering or boxing things that we may then regain control over them; 
rather, it is a minimal ontology of the internally divided nature of things. The latter 
encyclopaedic task is rather different. According to Garcia, ‘an object is a thing that matters 
within another thing’40 and the task is to categorise and classify ‘the swarming universe’ of 
objects with which we are more familiar: from the universe itself, through discussions of 
animals and humans, to culture, history and values and finally to the ages of life, and death. As 
he says, ‘the objective system is rich in content, in significations, in relations, in novelties, in 
accumulation, in choices, in disciplines, divided and multiplied in every direction, ad 
infinitum’.41 These two tasks – providing an account of a minimal, flat, ontology of things and 
a richly dimensional universe of objects – instils Garcia’s project with the necessary tools for 
both the diagnosis of our ‘epidemic of things’ and the therapeutic tools to consider what is at 
stake if we want to consider a life after possession. 
Recalling that we humans are also things – that we are not only things that think but 
that our thought about things is also a thing – means that we too are internally divided, that we 
can only be defined, in a strict sense, as that difference between that which is in us and that in 
which we are. Moreover, as we are also objects in the sense that we are composed of things 
that matter in other things, so we can also be considered as members of the universe of objects 
that is ‘rich in content’. But what is the critical import of these two claims? We have long since 
got used to the idea that human beings are divided within themselves and that in many respects 
our internal division is the result of our deep submersion within a world of things; at least to 
the extent that we have taken on board the insights of the philosophers of suspicion. What is 
innovative and controversial in Garcia’s position, however, is twofold. First, that our ‘thingly’ 
nature means that the epidemic of things can be diagnosed in a direct way; ‘the formal plane 
of thought enables us to cut short all epistemic, experiential, or enacted accumulation through 
simplicity’.42 Secondly, that there is no hope for the resolution of our submersion in the world 
of things that can be rooted in our subjective capacity to possess ourselves. Nothing in the 
richly textured universe of objects – things in things – can be found that will overcome the 
internally divided nature of things: be it, science, culture, spirit or philosophy itself. The 
universe of objects will not save us from the epidemic of things. According to Garcia, if we 
can and must consider ourselves to be things in order to avoid an ontological framework 
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structured by unwarranted hierarchies and if things are defined by their lack of self-possession, 
then we can no longer be considered as beings capable of self-possession. The upshot is that 
any potential subjective resolution of the problem brought about by the epidemic of things can 
only be a chimera. 
This chimerical search for resolution is given the name ‘compact’ by Garcia. 
Unsurprisingly, given his division between a formal account of things and an encyclopaedic 
account of objects, there are two elements to his analyses of compactness. On the one hand, 
there is the claim that nothing can be compact ‘in itself’. On the other hand, there is the claim 
that compactness exists but only as failure. The argument for the first claim is worth quoting 
at length: 
If something is in itself, it is because there is confusion between ‘that which is’ 
and ‘that which it is’, between ‘that which is in this thing’ and ‘that in which this thing 
is’: ‘self’. We are left with two possibilities. Either a minimal difference exists between 
the self ‘which is in’ and the self ‘in which it is’, in which case there is not one self but 
two selves. Or no difference exists between the self which is in and the self in which it 
is, in which case there cannot be something, since something is defined simply as the 
difference of the ‘in’ between that which is in and that in which it is. 
In the first case, two selves exist. In the second case, no selves exist. Something 
in ‘itself’ either comprehends two things, or comprehends no thing.43 
In summary, what we think about a thing and what we think about our thought about the thing 
will either create a split self, incapable of being a single compact self, or it will create a sense 
of self that cannot think the very thing we are trying to think about. There are echoes of 
Meillassoux’s critique of correlationalism and Harman’s account of object oriented philosophy 
in this argument though the differences between these positions is every bit as important.44 
Meillassoux argues through the correlationist circle in order to reach a claim that is ‘after 
finitude’ (we can know something about reality in its own right because we are the beings that 
think about these things).45 Harman, in contrast, rejects the idea that we have to go through the 
correlation of thinking and being to access objects, but argues that what we come to know about 
objects will always be finite because ‘finitude is not just a local spectre haunting the human 
subject, but a structural feature of relations in general including non-human ones’.46 In contrast 
to both, Garcia does not think that we need to argue through the correlationist circle – at least 
we should take the chance of thinking that what is ‘thought, said and known’ are themselves 
things – and that we can have unlimited access to the nature of things. Whereas, Meillassoux’s 
argument rests upon a positive, affirmative, rationalism and intellectualism, Garcia and 
Harman employ a rationalism of the negation, one in which the principle aim is that of de-
determining objects. However, where Harman’s is a form of negativity framed as constant 
withdrawal, Garcia’s is a dialectical negation of a more open-ended nature. Hence Harman’s 
objects are always withdrawing from themselves, even though they do in a sense exist in 
themselves, whereas Garcia’s things are purely formal and in this sense do not exist in 
themselves at all. For Garcia, there is nothing, no thing, that has a compact nature.  
As Cogburn notes, compactness is ‘perhaps the major antagonist in Garcia’s text’.47 I 
suggest that we follow Garcia and drop the ‘perhaps’: compactness, he says at the outset, ‘will 
be the adversary of our whole adventure of thought’.48 But why is this lack of equivocation 
important? The answer to this question provides a route back to the second aspect of Garcia’s 
critique of compactness; that it exists but always fails. We can see how this works if we ask a 
simple question: how does Garcia claim to know that the formal model of things he proposes 
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has any veracity? Situating Garcia’s critique of compactness solely as a response to the idea of 
the ‘in itself’ risks presenting it as simply dogmatic. However, there are key elements to 
Garcia’s project that suggest it should not be read as the simple presentation of a dogmatic 
system. From the opening pages we are invited to put the book down if we want to consider 
the conditions of thought that engender our thinking about things: ‘whoever expects philosophy 
to teach them about knowledge, consciousness, or individual and collective subjectivity more 
broadly, must be forewarned: they may be disappointed’.49 The opening gambit, therefore, is 
to philosophise as if the Kantian epistemological turn had never happened. Garcia, however, 
goes on to develop this into a second claim; ‘our time is plagued by the metaphysics of 
access’.50 None of the attempts to theorise ‘our methodological access to things’51 get us any 
closer to thinking about the ‘thingly contamination of the present’.52 More particularly, these 
exercises in transcendental philosophy that define the post-Kantian philosophical milieu have, 
thirdly, hindered our attempts at understanding this contamination. If we are to understand how 
this contamination has taken place such that we are suffering from an epidemic of things then 
we must begin with a direct assault on the nature of things so that ‘we make no promises that 
we cannot keep’.53 All of which adds up to another reason why compactness is so essential for 
Garcia; it provides a pragmatic response to the problem of veracity. The test of the truth or not 
of his minimal metaphysics of things will be the extent to which it is useful in overcoming our 
objective sense of being possessed by things. Challenging, as thoroughly as possible, the idea 
that any thing – traditional things, subjects and our thought about both – either is or may 
become compact in itself motivates the entirety of his response to the epidemic of things. That 
these attempts exist is undeniable, and yet for Garcia their existence is marked by failure; 
‘compactness is the presence in the world of impossibility, its mode of possibility; failure. 
Nothing is impossible, but some thing (compactness) is possible if and only if it fails – and 
fails in the world’.54 Showing the failure of compact thinking is the main aim of the much 
longer second part of the book, the part that deals with the encyclopaedia of objects. All of 
which is reason to think that Garcia’s central philosophical claim – there is no thing in itself – 
is best read as a pragmatic and critical contribution to the problem of compactness, the idea 
that anything may possess itself, that defines modernity rather than as a direct riposte to Kant 
or as solely an intervention in the age-old realism vs idealism debates.  
Having established this pragmatic and critical reading of compactness at the heart of 
his project, it then makes sense to claim that Form and Object is best approached an anti-
Rousseauean treatise. The real targets of the book are those who think that there is a manner of 
collective self-possession that will save us from the epidemic of things. As such, Garcia is both 
the heir to McPherson in that he accepts that no individual (thing or person) can be said to be 
truly self-possessed, while he is also a critic of McPherson to the extent that he questions the 
ideal of a form of social compact that can instantiate self-possession at the level of the 
collective. Where the socialist McPherson found the roots of bourgeois liberalism in the 
possessive individualism of Hobbes, Harrington and Locke; Garcia finds the roots of all claims 
to self-possession, of Right and Left, in the presumption of the compact nature of things. The 
claim about the impossibility of compact things and the existence yet failure of compact objects 
functions as a critical perspective on both the possessive individualism so definitive of 
modernity – that we are what we possess – and also as a critical perspective that points to the 
necessary failure of all attempts to overcome neo-liberalism by appeal to our collective self-
possession. Pitting the internal and interminable gap between that which is in a thing and that 
which a thing is against the social compact of Rousseau, Garcia constructs a perspective on the 
problem of possession that is highly original and compelling because it justifies its veracity 
pragmatically ‘for those of us who love things, but who struggle in the face of their 
accumulation’.55 Moreover, this pragmatism is on the side of things and objects rather than 
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individuals and collectives and, to this extent, it offers a route out of the impasses that beset 
the masters of suspicion. But what is this route beyond our cultures of possession and 
consumption and what hope, if any, does it offer if we are drawn to the prospect, as Garcia is, 
of a life after possession? 
 
After Possession: the problem, the Chance and the Price 
In making explicit the critique of possessiveness that guides Garcia’s project, both as 
motivation and as pragmatic justification of his minimal metaphysics, I am claiming that it is 
better to situate Form and Object amongst the pantheon of modern critical theory than among 
the classics of ‘pure’ metaphysics. While approaching the problem of possession from the side 
of the thing might seem to rule this out, to the extent that the critical tradition is usually defined 
by subjective reflexivity, it would be a mistake to introduce this arbitrary distinction if it 
blinded us to the force and contemporary relevance of Garcia’s appeal to a life after 
possession.56 It is interesting to note, in this regard, that Harman reports that in their first 
conversation together Garcia remarked that his philosophical apprenticeship was shaped by his 
adolescent engagement with the Frankfurt School.57 For all that it is a text that Horkheimer and 
Adorno would barely recognise as critical theory, I have sought to make clear that the impact 
of this tradition is evident from the opening sentence of Form and Object: ‘our time is perhaps 
the time of an epidemic of things’.58 The critical interrogation of ‘our time’ may then appear 
buried underneath the welter of metaphysical claims that define his approach to the thing, but 
for all that, it remains a text that makes its appeal to us, now, and that justifies its veracity in 
terms of how useful or not we find his critique of compactness, for us, now.  
Indeed, we can now summarise the critical heart of Form and Object. For Garcia, there 
is nothing, no thing, that possesses itself (ourselves included) and, given this, all objects are 
collections of ‘things which matter in things’ that may appear ordered in compact forms but 
that can, in fact, always be reordered differently because of their own internal division and the 
internal division within the things from which they are constituted. This is not only a critique 
of essentialism from the side of the thing rather than the subject, it is a critique of both liberal 
contracts and socialist compacts. Liberal contract theory rests upon the possessive 
individualism so astutely characterised and criticised by McPherson, and Garcia can be said to 
join McPherson in undermining the objective forms of politics that follow from this idea of 
compact individualism. Where Garcia’s approach to these matters (that is, from the side of the 
thing) makes a difference is that he is also able to call into question the necessary appearance 
and failure of attempts to challenge possessive individualism in the name of a collective 
subject. In general, then, for all that it may seem to be as distant from such concerns as any 
book could be, Garcia’s project is nonetheless a critique of all individualist claims to self-
possession (that which is in a thing) and of all collective claims to the intrinsic nature of 
relations (that in which a thing is) that underpin the hope of collective self-possession.  
There is, nonetheless, a problem in the critical apparatus that animates Garcia’s project. 
As Livingstone puts it, ‘it is not clear how the overarching division between the formal world 
of things and the objective universe of objects itself is to be motivated…despite the detail and 
insight with which Garcia develops the internal characterisation of both domains, he says little 
about how the passage from one to the other is produced or traversed’.59 I have given one 
answer to this problem: Garcia’s discussion is motivated by a strong, albeit heterodox, sense 
of critical intervention in the cultures of accumulation and possession that define our current 
age. Another response, which develops the first, is to recognise that compact objects – such as 
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individuals, collectives, cultures, spirit and so on – do appear to be present in our world but 
only to the extent that they fail because of the intrinsically uncompacted nature of things. In 
this sense, part II of Form and Object is methodologically prior to part I: there is no 
metaphysically proper way to move from things to objects; rather, we can only de-
substantialise objects in order to reach a maximally flat ontology of things. But Livingstone’s 
point is rather more cutting. How do objects appear at all, if there are only de-determined things 
in our metaphysics of the world? I agree with Livingstone when he says that there is no clear 
account of this given by Garcia. Where I would add a different slant to Livingstone’s problem 
is that this may not matter. To back up this claim, however, is to move Form and Object away 
from an interpretive framework that treats it solely as a metaphysical treatise that must build 
its claims from the bottom-up, so to speak. It is more in keeping with his project to treat Garcia 
as aligned to Badiou’s subtractive metaontology: our ontological claims are only to be derived 
by subtracting all that is inessential from what is, in this case the objects of the world.60 
Moreover, this interpretive move can also bring us to the final insight that can be garnered from 
Garcia’s text: the chance and price to pay of living after possession. 
Methodologically speaking, Garcia must assume that objects are simply present and 
that their presence in the universe can change. In a claim that puts him within and yet decisively 
at odds with the process philosophies of, for example, Whitehead and Deleuze, Garcia 
attributes such change in objects to events.61 The sense in which he joins the tradition of process 
philosophy is simply this: he treats the changes within objects as events that give us no reason 
to rest content with their apparent permanence; or compactness, in Garcia’s terminology. 
Where he pits himself directly against such process philosophies is in how he treats events. 
Whereas, process philosophies treat events as the condition of emergence for that which we 
encounter in our everyday world, Garcia is suspicious of such claims because he argues that 
such approaches can only lead to both a multiplication of emergent things and a reduction of 
those things to one, compact, notion of the event. His task, in contrast, is to retain a minimal 
account of things that does not lead to their rapid multiplication but that also avoids their 
reduction into a mystical sense of the event. Now that his notion of the event is brought into 
view, initially at least, we can see the critical purchase of his minimal ontology: ‘every ontology 
that privileges events over objects and things, or objects rather than things and events, or things 
to the detriment of objects and events, is groundless and systematically leads to compactness’.62 
His approach to avoiding ontologies that lead to compactness is to treat events as 
intensive variations in the presence of objects. Intensification, for Garcia, is the moment when 
the difference between what an object contains and that which contains them is changed. Such 
intensification occurs when objects ‘comprehend’ each other. Comprehension is a technical 
term for Garcia that is defined as the sense objects make of each other. As such, objects are 
intensified at the moment of their comprehension, when they make sense of each other. There 
are philosophical conundrums that follow from this account of comprehension and 
intensification.63 For our purposes, though, the main point from a critical perspective is that 
such intensification is the moment of extended differentiation between that which is in a thing 
and that in which a thing is. It is, in short, the pulling apart of that which appears compact in 
order to expose its internal differences such that they can be reconstituted in new ways. 
Comprehension as a moment of intensification, therefore, is the critical motif that articulates 
Garcia’s subtractive method without instantiating what he would see as a mystical privileging 
of thing, object or event. It is for this reason that we can say his analysis is more than an 
extension of the idea that notions of self-possession are socially constructed. For all that the 
reading of Form and Object developed above situates the book within a critical tradition, it is 
equally clear that there is no scope within Garcia’s system for an appeal to ‘social construction’ 
as this would require a claim about the compact nature of the social that is anathema to his 
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position. It would be more in keeping with his approach to objects to claim that the outcome 
of his challenge to possessiveness leads toward the idea that all objects (individuals and 
collectives) exist within and between ‘overlapping and contradictory classes’.64 However, in 
itself this claim does not fully express the critical dimension of his appeal to comprehension as 
a moment of intensification. Comprehension of our contradictory existence requires actively 
reconstituting the classes to which we belong. But to what end?  
Garcia’s critical response to the epidemic of things can now be articulated in terms of 
its purpose: all objects, ourselves included, can become more of what they are by intensifying 
the difference that makes them what they are – that is, the difference between what they contain 
and what they are contained within. This intensification, we can now say on the basis of 
situating Garcia’s argument within the modern tradition of the critique of self-possession, is 
the task of living a life without self-possession, or living a life after possession. There is a 
strong existentialist twist to this conclusion: ‘objective accumulation is our condition. We 
experience existential suffocation from it, but it also forms an opening allowing us to take in 
the world amidst objects’.65 In ridding ourselves of the objective determinations of who we are, 
we are able to constitute our life in ways that avoid the dangers of compactness. In contrast to 
the existentialist, however, this life will never be authentic in the sense that might reintroduce 
a concern about a compact notion of identity, at either the individual or collective level. Garcia, 
we might say, is an existentialist of the internally divided thing.  The intensive life requires 
resisting the idea that we are already self-possessed individuals and resisting the idea that we 
are individuals defined by our collective existence, thereby resisting any over-arching 
collective definition of who we are as collectively possessed beings. It is a call for a life of 
contradiction, of paradoxes, and a call to resist every objective attempt to remove these 
paradoxes. The price to pay for living after possession is the tragedy of never being able to 
reconcile oneself with oneself – but maybe it is a price worth paying given the disastrous effects 
of living under cultural, economic and political regimes based on the unsustainable idea of our 
ability to possess ourselves. A life after possession may be worth the price of it being a 
paradoxical and contradictory life. 
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